The development of oil and gas extraction technologies, including hydraulic fracturing (fracking), has increased fossil fuel reserves in the US. Despite benefits, uncertainty over environmental damages has led to fracking bans, both permanent and temporary, in many jurisdictions. We develop a stochastic dynamic learning model parameterized with a computable general equilibrium model to explore if uncertainty about damages, combined with the ability to learn about risks, can explain fracking bans in practice. Applying the model to a representative Colorado municipality, we quantify the quasi-option value (QOV), which creates an additional incentive to ban fracking temporarily in order to learn, though it only influences policy in a narrow range of oil and gas prices. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify an economy-wide QOV associated with a local environmental policy decision. JEL: C61, C68, Q38, Q58
Introduction
New technologies for extracting oil and gas from shale deposits-most importantly, hydraulic fracturing (fracking)-have greatly increased fossil fuel reserves across the United States and beyond. While these innovations have the potential to bring substantial economic benefits (Hausman and Kellogg 2015) , they also have the potential to create environmental costs (Muehlenbachs et al. 2015 , Krupnick and Gordon 2015 , Hill 2013 . Many jurisdictions have temporarily banned fracking (e.g., Longmont, CO; New York State; Germany), despite, in some cases, seemingly positive expected net local benefits (Wobbekind et al., 2014) . Plausibly, such bans stem from the high degree of uncertainty about potential harm, together with the opportunity to learn from experiences elsewhere during the ban. Of course, this is a classic quasioption value story applied to a situation in which a novel technology gives rise to uncertain environmental risks.
Our goal in this paper is to develop a framework that can be used to quantify the quasi-option value (QOV) and assess its importance to the prevalence of fracking bans in practice. To do this, we develop a methodology for linking an empirically grounded computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a dynamic QOV model, allowing for a data-driven estimation of the QOV associated with a real-world environmental policy choice. Since fracking affects many agents within a community, a CGE model that quantifies economy-wide consumption impacts over time provides the information needed to evaluate a potential ban. Solving a dynamic program containing a large-dimensional CGE presents a substantial numerical challenge, but we overcome it by assuming that local fracking benefits are additively separable from uncertain fracking damages. Under this assumption, we are able to solve the model by running the CGE model across all potential policy scenarios, and use the resulting consumption paths as an input to a finite-time, stochastic dynamic program with Bayesian learning. The methodology developed here is one of the first to place a numerical value on the economy-wide QOV associated with learning about local environmental damages.
By choosing to implement a temporary ban, policymakers delay fracking benefits but learn about the true magnitude of fracking damages from an informative, though noisy, signal. Allowing fracking brings economic benefits with uncertain, potentially irreversible, damages. The framework allows for the quantification of the economy-wide, and hence social, quasi-option value that arises from the preservation of the option to avoid irreversible environmental damages.
It also permits consideration of additional factors that influence the economic decision to develop unconventional plays, including the value of local oil and gas reserves.
We parameterize the model to match a representative municipality in the US state of Colorado.
In this setting, despite positive expected economy-wide net benefits from fracking, a ban can be rationalized at current oil prices 4 if the learning process is sufficiently precise. Results indicate that a one-period reduction in the time required to reduce the variance of uncertain environmental damages by half is, on average, equivalent to a $1 per barrel increase in the price of oil. This suggests that while the ability to learn can influence optimal policy choices, the value of local reserves likely plays a larger role. Nevertheless, increasing the precision of future information about fracking damages increases the likelihood of a ban in initial periods; though after this initial ban, policymakers allow fracking more frequently when it is beneficial and continue banning when it is not.
The ability to delay and revisit an uncertain and irreversible decision with better information is valuable (Arrow and Fischer 1974 , Henry 1974 , Hanemann 1988 , Dixit and Pindyck 1994 . Traeger (2014) defines the QOV as the value of learning, conditional on the ability to postpone a decision. Yet, to our knowledge, an economy-wide QOV has not been quantified in an applied policy setting.
For the most part, the existing economics literature on fracking focuses on either benefits or costs. Fracking benefits include increased employment (Weber 2012; Maniloff and Mastromonaco 2015) , welfare improvements for producers and consumers of natural gas (Hausman and Kellogg 2015) , and revenues to mineral rights owners (Brown and Fitzgerald) .
Others have investigated fracking burdens (Krupnick, Wang, and Wang 2014; Krupnick and Gordon 2015) , including property value impacts (Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2015) and health effects (Chen, et al. 2000; Aguilera et al. 2009; Slama et al., 2009; Hill 2013) . Hedonic analyses of fracking impacts on property values can also provide a means to capture net fracking impacts (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014; Bennett and Loomis 2015) . Our contribution, in contrast, builds on the prior literatures on fracking benefits and costs, while embedding a local fracking policy decision within an explicit decision-theoretic framework. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to quantify the value of learning about the full costs of fracking in practice, and the first to carefully assess the economic rationale for observed bans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of fracking bans in practice and reviews the literature on fracking and option values. Section 3 introduces the model and Section 4 discusses our parameterized application and economic assumptions. Section 5 presents the results of the numerical model and Section 6 provides a discussion and concludes.
Related Literature and Background
This section begins with an overview of local opposition to fracking
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. We then describe the current literature on the economic benefits of fracking and the uncertain damages. Finally, we relate the current paper to the literature on uncertainty and learning in environmental economics.
Fracking Bans
Fracking bans in the US began in November 2010 when Pittsburg implemented a city-wide ban. Graham et al. (2014) find that the public is most concerned about water quality and seismic activity, despite a general scientific consensus that best practices manage these particular risks well.
Economic Benefits of Fracking
While it is obvious that exploiting valuable fossil fuel reserves will confer economic value, it is less clear how much of the created value will accrue to the local economy where fracking occurs. Hausman and Kellogg (2015) use an econometric approach and find economy-wide total surplus 8 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/colorado-court-strikes-down-local-bans-on-fracking.html 9 It was upheld in 2013.
gains of a third of a percent in the US. Regionally focused work has estimated significant employment gains -ex ante -to Pennsylvania (Considine et al. 2010) , Colorado (Wobbekind et al. 2014), and Arkansas (CBER 2008) . However, these studies use input-output models and results are sensitive to assumptions about household spending and savings behavior, labor supply elasticity, and mineral rights ownership. This means that benefits are likely to be significantly overstated (Kinnaman 2011) . More recent ex post analyses find much smaller employment impacts than ex ante predictions (Weber 2012) . Maniloff and Mastromonaco (2015) find that ex post job growth fell 'well short' of ex ante predictions. Furthermore, there is a debate as to the persistence of economic benefits in so-called 'boom towns' (Allcott and Keniston 2011; Jacobsen and Parker 2014) . Contrary to previous findings by Allcott and Keniston (2011) , Maniloff and Mastomonaco (2015) find evidence of increases in manufacturing wages which could harm the competitiveness of non-resource sectors.
In the model developed here, local fracking benefits are captured using a calibrated CGE model that includes oil and gas production. The portion of benefits that accrue locally follows from our assumptions about nonlocal resource ownership.
Fracking Damages
Despite a consensus that risks exist, there remain significant gaps in the literature connecting risk pathways to economic impacts (Jackson et al. 2014; Shonkoff et al. 2014 ). Krupnick and Gordon (2015) prescribe important pathways through which routine fracking activities may impact humans and the environment. Examples include habitat disruption, groundwater contamination, air quality degradation, community disruption, and surface water contamination. Their survey of 215 experts from industry, academia, government, and NGOs finds a high degree of consensus concerning the most important pathways that arise during normal fracking activities.
Hedonic property valuation studies have attempted to quantify the cost of these local impacts (Boxall, et al. 2005; Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014) . Typically, these studies find negative impacts on housing values from nearby oil and gas development, especially if the home depends on groundwater (Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2015) . Bennett and Loomis (2015) estimate that each well drilled within a half-mile of a house in Weld County, Colorado decreases the home value by $1,805 in urban areas.
Many human health studies have focused on benzene pollution 10 outside the fracking context (Chen, et al. 2000; Aguilera et al. 2009; Slama et al., 2009; Zahran et al. 2012 ) and have highlighted significant health damages, including low birth weight. Hill (2013) shows that fracking in Pennsylvania increased the occurrence of low birth weight (by 25%) and term birth weight (by 18%). She estimates a lower bound of the public cost to be $4.1 million due to low infant birth weights caused by benzene air pollution from fracking in Pennsylvania in 2010.
Learning about Environmental Risks
Weisbrod (1964) initiated the irreversible decision literature. Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) develop the use of the quasi-option value in the environmental and resource economics literature, and Hanemann (1989) formalizes the notion into what is now commonly called the -Fisher-Hanemann-Henry Quasi-Option Value (QOV) . A similar concept, the real options approach, developed independently in the finance literature. Pindyck (1991) shows its usefulness in a dynamic programming application, and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) bring the real options approach to the mainstream environmental and resource economics literature. Mensink and Requate (2005) point out that the Dixit and Pindyck option value (DPOV) and the QOV are not necessarily equivalent. Specifically, they find that when postponement is initially beneficial and the net present value of a project is strictly positive, the DPOV captures the QOV in addition to the value created from doing the project in a later period in the absence of learning.
Arrow
Traeger (2014) extends Mensink and Requate (2005) and provides a general relationship between QOV and DPOV: the QOV is the value of learning conditional on postponement and the DPOV is the net value of postponement under learning. The literature proves two important properties of the QOV that are relevant to our model. Arrow and Fisher (1974) show that the QOV is increasing in prior uncertainty in the special case of linear net benefits (although Hanemann (1989) demonstrates that this does not hold in general). Second, Hanemann (1989) shows that the QOV increases as future information becomes more precise. These properties imply that high uncertainty and fast learning increase the QOV, making a temporary ban more likely.
QOV models are routinely applied to climate policy. Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) argue that the failure of global warming models to account for irreversibility has led to an understated need for immediate action, though Ulph and Ulph (1997) show that Epstein's (1980) irreversibility conditions are not met for even a simple, two-period model of global warming. Kolstad (1996a) jointly examines capital investment in abatement (sunk-cost irreversibility) and environmental damages from the stock of carbon (emissions irreversibility) and argues that either sufficiently fast learning or sufficiently slow carbon decay makes either decision irreversible. Kolstad (1996b) concludes that capital investment irreversibility increases initial optimal emissions levels (lowers abatement). Fisher and Narain (2003) support this result, finding that the negative effect of capital irreversibility on optimal abatement outweighs the impact of irreversible environmental damages. Lemoine and Traeger (2014) model irreversible changes in climate sensitivity as an unknown threshold is crossed, but learning is strictly ex post in their model.
They find that the existence of 'tipping points' raises the optimal first-period carbon tax.
Learning models in which policymakers make a path of decisions over time have also been widely applied in the resource economics literature (Walters 1986; Holling and A notable exception to this result is Jensen and Traeger (2013) . This model incorporates normally distributed Bayesian learning about uncertain climate sensitivity and stochastic temperature increases, which determines both the rate of learning and expected damages.
Interestingly, when the rate of learning becomes stochastic -and signals are less informative -, the impact of juxtaposing uncertainty and learning is to increase optimal carbon abatement, even in an adaptive loop problem.
We model the decision to ban fracking as an irreversible decision in a context of uncertainty and learning for three reasons. First, in practice, fracking is a relatively new technology and little is known about it
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. This uncertainty becomes resolved over time as the industry learns best practices, as municipalities learn how to regulate, as the public becomes familiar with the technology, and as the body of scientific analysis grows. Second, the decision to frack for most policymakers today is irreversible. Many of the potential damages associated with fracking (e.g., groundwater contamination) can have irreversible consequences and once fracking is allowed, the industry will resist rule changes after investing in a jurisdiction
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. Irreversibility aligns our finite horizon dynamic model with the QOV literature, though uncertainty is never completely resolved. Third, fracking moratoria have been successfully enacted or adopted in the US, at both the state and local levels, as well as internationally. These temporary bans represent a delay in an irreversible action and allow the decision to be revisited in the future. The QOV approach to environmental problems says that uncertainty that resolves over time, potentially irreversible environmental damage, and the ability to postpone the decision lead to an additional benefit of delaying a project. In this case, even when the expected net present value of undertaking a project is positive, it may be economically optimal to delay the project and revisit the decision with better information. This model allows us to quantify the value of learning in the context of local fracking decisions and to present a positive economic analysis of its effects on local policy.
Model
To examine the role of uncertainty and learning in local fracking policy, we develop a dynamic information model that accounts for the benefits of fracking as well as uncertain irreversible damages that can become better understood over time. A computable general equilibrium model is used to quantify the economic benefits of drilling in an empirically grounded way.
Dynamic Learning Framework
The policymaker faces a decision in discrete time periods 0,1, 2,..., t T = . In each period, a local policymaker chooses to ban or allow fracking. Specifically, she chooses
where "0" denotes BAN and "1" denotes FRACK. The policymaker in t observes the full history of past decisions:
) . For example, a ban followed by two periods without a ban, would be represented as
Economy-wide consumption is represented as a series C t+ j
T −t where C t+ j is the deterministic local consumption in period t + j . C t+ j depends on the prior fracking history -in particular, if and when fracking began. Baseline consumption is defined as the case in which fracking is always banned. If fracking is allowed, there is a surge in economy-wide consumption stemming from royalties on extracted resources Economy-wide consumption in time t is a function of the history, H t−1 , and the present choice, χ t , and is written as C H t ( ) .
Let η be the environmental damages of fracking, expressed in dollars. η is a stochastic variable with a normal distribution but its true value is only revealed if, and when, fracking occurs. The parameters of the normal distribution are not known with certainty but decision-makers have a belief in each time period about the values of the mean and variance of the distribution. Learning from the noisy signal causes beliefs about η to evolve so that in time t,
. We use a constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function over net consumption, and
denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion as ρ .
Separability
To facilitate numerical tractability, we assume that local environmental damages, η are additively separable from the economy-wide consumption impacts of fracking. This assumption dramatically reduces the dimensionality of the numerical problem because it allows us to solve the economy-wide model for each feasible policy path. Without it, we would need to solve the model for every realization in the much larger (indeed, infinite) set of potential damages.
Current Net Benefit Flow
If fracking is allowed ( ), then the expected current flow of net benefits is the expected utility of the higher consumption level less damages, expressed as where E η is the expectation over η . If fracking is banned ( ), the current flow of net benefits is the utility of baseline consumption: . For succinctness, we write the utility function as where the choice variable controls whether or not there are damages. This implies that the expected current flow is .
Note the expectation is trivial if the fracking ban is maintained (and no damages are incurred in the current period) or if fracking occurred in a previous period revealing the true damages, η * .
Once allowed, fracking results in a constant flow of health and environmental damages, η .
Damages persist for ten 5-year periods beyond the time when fracking begins 13 . Learning brings better information about the distribution of η . In the initial period, the policymaker has prior beliefs about the mean, µ 0 , and variance,σ 0
Once fracking is allowed, uncertainty is resolved and collapses to the true damage,η * . We assume the decision to allow fracking is irreversible. If fracking is banned, the policymaker can benefit from learning through advancements in scientific knowledge over time or observations on fracking outcomes in other locations. Consequently, in time t, the mean and variance of η are updated to µ t ,σ t 2 ( ) reflecting updated knowledge about damages. 13 We could alternatively model fracking damages as a one-time event. The crucial assumption is that conditional on fracking, future damages are exogenous from the perspective of the current decision-maker. 14 Note that the signal is produced by a draw around the true damages so that the process generating the signal is ! = * + ! .
and
Provided σ ε 2 < ∞ , the learning process converges to the true η = η * as t goes to infinity.
Meanwhile, the rate of learning depends on the variance of the signal noise. If ! ! is large, the signal is relatively uninformative and learning is slow. As σ ε 2 shrinks, the signal becomes more informative and uncertainty is resolved faster.
Bellman Equation
The decision is posed as a recursive problem with three state variables. The first is the history of past decisions:
The other states characterize beliefs about damages, which are normally distributed and are fully characterized by the mean ( µ t ) and variance (σ t 2 ).
Irreversibility is modeled by a restricted choice set χ t ∈ χ t−1 ,1 { } , and we assume a ban is in place as of t = 0 .
The Bellman equation in time t is written as follows:
The first term on the right-hand side of equation 3 is the expected current flow of utility, conditional on beliefs, µ t and σ t 2 . The second and third terms describe the continuation value if fracking is banned or allowed, respectively. Although we are mainly interested in situations for which the option to ban remains (i.e. fracking has not occurred), the equation also depicts the value in time t if fracking has already occurred. In this case, the choice set is χ t ∈ 1,1
Moreover, the true value of damages, η * , is realized in the period in which fracking occurred implying µ t = η * , σ t 2 = 0 . Then, if fracking already occurred, the value function as of time t
Option Values
Traeger (2014) 15 suggests a convenient way to summarize the determinants of optimal policy.
For the current setting, this so-called Quasi-Option Value Rule can be summarized as follows:
V t soph is the full value of sophistication, NPV t is the present value of the expected net gain from fracking, QOV t is the quasi-option value, and SOV t is the simple option value. All values are 15 Building on Arrow and Fisher (1974) , Henry (1974), and Hanneman (1989) .
expressed in utility units, and functional arguments are suppressed. V t soph captures the presumption that a fully sophisticated decision-maker would value both the ability to delay a project ( SOV t ) and the ability to learn about the project ( QOV t ) when flexibility is preserved.
Traeger (2014) shows that V t soph , QOV t , SOV t , and NPV t can be constructed from three value functions: learning, postponement, and now or never. These can be defined in the context of our model as follows:
the present value of a ban by a policymaker who anticipates learning;
the present value of a ban by a policymaker who anticipates the ability to revisit the decision -to postpone it -but does not anticipate the ability to learn;
the present value of fracking to a policymaker who does not anticipate the decision will be revisited -a now or never perspective.
The respective value functions become
The first and second equations in (5) differ in the stochastic variable over which the expected continuation values are calculated. The first equation takes the expectation of , the signal, and
anticipates updated beliefs about the damage distribution. In the second equation, no signal is anticipated, so beliefs do not change over time and there is only uncertainty over the damage
parameter, η . Consequently, the state variables in this case are not time-dependent and the expectation is taken with respect to η rather than s . Conditional on allowing fracking, the value is the same in each case:
( ) . Following Traeger (2014) we calculate 
Parameterizing the Model
This section describes the process used to embed the calibrated CGE model results within the dynamic QOV framework ,which allows us to quantify the benefits and costs of fracking under the possibility of learning about uncertain environmental damages. The model is applied to a representative Colorado municipality to investigate a practical situation in which a fracking ban may be optimal. We first describe the development of the CGE model used to calculate the consumption benefits of fracking with a focus on how the policy simulations are set up. Next, we present the process used to construct a distribution of damages based on initial beliefs about the
range of damages. These two parameterized components are combined to generate a parameterized Bellman equation as presented in Equation 3.
CGE Model
We use a CGE model that is an adaptation of Cutler and Davies (2007) Output and factor prices are endogenous, with perfectly mobile labor in five household groups.
Land and capital are quasi-fixed but respond over time to differences in rental rates. This implies that returns to land and capital are sector-specific in any time period. Local differences between demand and supply are met by imports (or exports when production exceeds demand). The CGE model also contains local, state, and federal government sectors. 16 The average size of Colorado cities above 10,000 people is ~55,000, excluding the capital city of Denver In addition to the standard factors of production, output in the oil and gas sector depends on a natural capital factor that captures the remaining accessible natural resource stock in the ground.
The size of this factor depends on whether or not a fracking ban is in place. Since reserves depend on allowable technology, a ban means the oil and gas sector has access to a smaller stock than if fracking were allowed. Thus, there is some (conventional) production even with a ban.
Fitzgerald and Rucker (2014) estimate average annual royalty rates for oil (13.3%-13.8%) and gas (10.5% -12.7%). Based on this, we assume that 12.5% of oil and gas production value is paid to the owners of those rights 17 .
The simulations computed are inspired by the 2013 Fort Collins moratoria, which was enacted to be five years. We calibrate the CGE model using annual data but in the QOV model, we use 5-year periods that are constructed by summing the output of the CGE model over 5 years. In addition, we assume that policymakers revisit the ban/frack decision every (five year) period for five model periods (25 years), after which the option to allow fracking vanishes. Regardless of when fracking is allowed, benefits and damages accrue for ten periods. In the base scenario, the policymaker is risk averse with a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of 2, though we also consider the implications of risk neutrality. The base oil and gas prices are assumed to be $40 per barrel and $2.50 per thousand cubic feet respectively. Finally, the annual discount rate is set to 5 percent.
The simulations are constructed in the following way. To generate the no-fracking baseline, we simulate normal growth where total factor productivity and export demand are assumed to increase by one percent separately in the first period. The model then moves to a new steady 17 See Appendix A for a complete description of the data.
state after a 50-year time horizon. The second simulation assumes that fracking occurs in the first period along with normal growth. The mining of oil and gas increases by a factor of three. This is based on EIA estimates of oil reserves in Colorado, which climbed from 386 million barrels in 2010 to 1200 million barrels as of 2014. This observed increase in oil reserves occurred almost exclusively because of the introduction of fracking, and natural gas reserves experienced a similar increase (Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission). When reserves are exhausted, the excess extraction capital immediately exits the local economy. In the simulation, this occurs in the next (5-year) period. Separate simulations are computed for policy scenarios when fracking is allowed in years 6, 11, 16 and 21 to reflect the decision to allow fracking in each of these periods. This generates levels of household consumption associated with all policy scenarios used in the QOV model.
The recursive CGE model is solved with an annual time step and a 50-year time horizon.
Consumption across years is aggregated to obtain 5-year consumption values, used as an input into the dynamic programming model. Figure 1 illustrates the consumption paths with spikes occurring at the time of fracking. After the initial shock, fracking stops as reserves are depleted and consumption falls, reaching a new steady state. To test for sensitivity to the price of oil and gas, the CGE model is used to evaluate the impact of fracking bans over a range of prices. Oil and gas prices are assumed to move together, increasing and decreasing from base values in equal proportions. Given our base specification, the annuitized value of the consumption benefits of fracking in the initial period is equal to ~$113.6 million per (5-year) period. 
Parameterization of Damages
In order to solve the model, we also parameterize the initial beliefs about the distribution of the monetary value of fracking damages,η . Given additive separability, this can occur independently from the parameterization of economic benefits described above. Recall that η is normally distributed with initial beliefs about the mean and standard error equal to µ 0 and σ 0 2 , respectively. The magnitude of these damages must be weighed against the consumption benefits of fracking, calculated in section 4.1.
To parameterize current beliefs about this distribution, we define a plausible range within which the monetary value of damages is likely to fall. First, we assume a 5% chance of negative damages (i.e., benefits) from fracking. This could occur if, for example, fracking allows natural gas to displace coal in local energy production, leading to cleaner air. At the other extreme, we assume that damages could exceed a high-damage scenario with a probability of 5%.
To define the high-damage scenario, we calculate the monetary cost of purchasing water rights to permanently replace the current surface water supply Although surface water moves very rapidly, on the order of meters per second, the pollutants can linger for decades if they are highly recalcitrant, like organochlorines or polychlorinated biphenyls (Baumann and Whittle 1988; Hooper et. al 1990; Garton et. al 1996) or radioactive (radon is naturally occurring in the uranium-rich soil of Colorado). Note: The x-axis is the value of the damage parameter, in millions of dollars. The yaxis is the probability. The 5% tails are shaded.
If fracking is allowed, fracking damages will be realized and, from the perspective of the policymaker, drawn from this distribution. If, on the other hand, fracking is banned, a policymaker anticipates receiving a signal that will provide information about the distribution of fracking damages.
Recall that the annuitized present value of the consumption benefits of fracking today is approximately $113.6 million per period. This suggests that, in expectation, the net benefits of fracking are positive. Under a naïve net-present value rule, a risk neutral policymaker would therefore allow fracking because the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Nevertheless, a policymaker that anticipates learning about the distribution of damages will wait before allowing fracking if the QOV is sufficiently valuable. To find the conditions under which a policymaker would continue to ban fracking we solve the parameterized dynamic option value model using the rule described in Equation 4.
Results
We first solve the model for a range of initial beliefs about damages and a range of assumptions about the rate of learning and examine if the ability to learn influences the optimal policy decisions. Then, we compare the role of learning to other factors such as the value of oil and gas reserves. Next, we quantify a monetary value of the QOV and use Monte Carlo simulations to show that faster learning leads to better decision-making over time. We finish with tests for the robustness of the results.
Optimal policy
To explore the impact of learning on the optimal policy decision, we solve the model for a range of values for the standard error of the signal noise, presented in Equation 1. Specifically, we are interested in estimating Equation 4 which compares the NPV t (the present value of the expected net increase in utility units from fracking) with estimates of QOV t (quasi-option value) and SOV t (simple option value). If the NPV is greater (less) than the sum of QOV and SOV, then it is optimal to FRACK (BAN).
Using the results from the CGE model discussed above and the estimates for QOV and SOV, Figure 3 presents the optimal initial-period policy for fast (σ ε = $1), medium (σ ε = $200 million), and slow (σ ε = $500 million) rates of learning as a function of initial beliefs about environmental damages. We also display the no-learning case. These curves mark the initial belief combinations where the policymaker is indifferent between allowing fracking and maintaining the ban. Intuitively, as learning becomes faster, there are fewer combinations of initial beliefs (less area under the curve) for which fracking is optimal. The parameterized initial beliefs are labeled and it becomes clear that the optimal policy in the calibrated model is sensitive to the rate of learning. When learning is slow, the optimal policy is to allow fracking since new information is relatively uninformative and unlikely to change next period's policy. In this case, the expected gains from fracking dominate the value of learning in influencing the optimal policy. Under the parameterized beliefs, it is optimal to maintain a ban, receive precise information about fracking damages, and revisit the decision next period if learning is fast. The ban occurs despite positive expected net benefits from fracking, so a simplistic benefit-cost framework that does not anticipate learning-a now or never approach-would allow fracking.
When σ ε = $211 million, the risk averse policymaker is indifferent between fracking and banning given the parameterized initial beliefs. This implies that the policymaker should implement a ban if she anticipates at least a 7.5% reduction in ! ! over the first 5 years (1 model period).
Notice that all three policy boundary curves converge to the same mean, µ 0 = $111.8 million as σ 0 → 0 . This occurs because information is only valuable under uncertainty. We denote this mean belief where policy switches under no uncertainty asμ so thatμ = $111.8 million. Beliefs that µ 0 <μ with low initial uncertainty (southwest corner) will result in a FRACK policy.
Similarly, beliefs that µ 0 >μ and the initial uncertainty is high (northeast corner) will result in a BAN policy. Increasing uncertainty while holding µ 0 =μ makes a ban more likely, due to the ability to learn about the true distribution. Even with no learning, risk aversion means that higher uncertainty can push towards a BAN.
Learning and the Value of Energy Resources
Figure 3 reveals that learning can play a pivotal role in the policy decision holding other economic factors constant. Now, we compare the impact of improved learning to changes in the resource value. We use the CGE model to compute the benefits of fracking for four oil and gas Note: The x-axis is the initial mean damage belief. The y-axis is the initial standard error belief. Each curve demarks where policy switches. Fast learning is ! = $1, medium learning is ! =$200 million, and slow learning is ! = $500 million; and the initial beliefs used in the calibration exercise are ! , ! = (100,60) million dollars. The slope of the line is the willingness to pay for lower uncertainty with decreased net benefits.
prices. Then, we fit a benefit function, b t, f , p ( ) , that maps current time period (t), when fracking began (f), and price of oil (p) into a dollar value of consumption benefits, (C): 
Quantifying the Option Value
Despite the relative importance of the value of reserves, the calibrated economy-wide QOV remains large, even in comparison to the consumption benefits of fracking. In order to calculate a monetary value of the QOV, we solve the model under risk neutrality. This enables us to express 20 This also suggests that the option value associated with learning about the price of oil may be quite large compared to learning about damages. This should be explored in future work. The QOV is largest ($101.5 million -$40.4 million = $61.1 million) when σ ε is smallest (learning is fast) and decreases, as learning slows. With risk neutrality, policy switches in our calibrated setting when ! = $177 million (labeled in Figure 5 ). At this learning rate, the initial variance drops 10% after the first signal. Recall that the cutoff under risk aversion ( ρ = 2 ) in Figure 3 was σ ε = $211 million, showing that a risk neutral policymaker requires faster learning (all else equal) to justify a fracking ban.
These QOV represents the value of information acquired during a temporary ban and its numerical value indicates that it is an economically important social value. When learning is fast, the QOV represents 12.76% of the $478.99 million in gross consumption benefits that fracking brings (in present value terms). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify a numerical, economy-wide QOV associated with an environmental policy decision.
Policy Simulation
Thus far, our results indicate that faster learning increases the QOV, incentivizing a moratorium on fracking, in the initial period. However, this does not show that policymakers interested in supporting economic development activities should prefer slow learning. Instead, as is intuitive, faster learning leads to better decision-making over time, both increasing fracking instances when it is beneficial and decreasing instances when it is not. To illustrate this, we simulate policy decisions for the base model ( ρ = 2 ) over a range of η * , from $60 million to $180 million (i.e., spanning the calibrated μ so that when η * is greater (less) than μ banning (fracking) is optimal ex post). The signals (described in Equation 1) depend on η * even when initial beliefs are held constant. We consider the fast and medium learning rates defined in section 5.1 and presented in Figure 3 . This means that the first period decision is always The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 6 . Results are displayed as the probability of making the correct (or incorrect) decision by the end of the 5-period decision horizon. In the left panel, damages are less than the benefits so fracking is beneficial. Under fast learning, fracking occurs 94% of the time by period 2 while with medium learning, it takes all 5 periods before at least 79% of simulations result in beneficial fracking. Note that 97% of the fast learning simulations frack by period 5, the terminal decision period. Recall that the policy switches at = $111.8 million but the annualized consumption benefits are $113.6 million. The reason that 3% of the fast-learning simulations do not frack when it is beneficial is risk aversion. That is, regardless of the level of certainty, a risk averse policymaker with mean beliefs µ t ∈ $111.8, $113.6 ( ) , t = 1, 2, 3, 4 will ban fracking under uncertainty even though it would bring an increase in net welfare ex post.
The right panel presents the result of simulations in which damages exceed the benefits, so a fracking ban optimizes ex post welfare. In this case, under fast learning an initial ban results in the optimal decision in every instance (i.e., the probability of fracking is always zero). On the other hand, under medium learning, there is a 45% chance fracking will eventually be allowed, even though it would reduce ex post welfare. Figure 6 illustrates that, despite incentivizing a moratorium in the first period, faster learning results in more fracking when it is beneficial and less when it is not. 
Sensitivity analyses
In Figure 7 , we explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to assumptions about initial damage distributions and risk aversion. First, we test robustness of the results to changes in initial beliefs.
The results in Figure 4 present the policy boundary curves under a mean-preserving spread of the initial damage distribution. Here, we hold fixed the standard error and let the mean change. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that the main conclusions are robust to these changes. Conditional on the initial beliefs, increasing the rate of learning has a relatively small impact on the policy decision. Initial beliefs about the mean do have a notable impact on the (still narrow) price range within which increasing the rate of learning plays a pivotal role in determining optimal policy.
In the right panel of Figure 7 , we assess the impact of changing the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The panel replicates the base curve in Figure 4 using a range of values for . As expected, increasing raises the oil prices for which a ban is optimal. It also increases the importance of the rate of learning in influencing the policy decision, indicated by the steeper slope of the high risk aversion boundary curve in Figure 7 . Despite this, even at high levels of risk aversion, the range of prices where learning is influential remains narrow. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Uncertainty about fracking damages and the ability to learn create a QOV that can impact the economic rationale for imposing a temporary ban on fracking activities. In our calibrated setting, we show that a moratorium can be justified if beliefs about environmental damage variance are expected to drop at least 7.5% before the decision is revisited (or 10% for a risk neutral policymaker). Faster learning also leads to better decision-making over time. Though learning can influence optimal policy, we find that its role is relatively unimportant when compared to plausible (indeed historical) fluctuations in the price of oil.
Although we emphasize a model of fracking policy, the developed methodology expands the class of problems that can be quantitatively approached with an option value framework.
Juxtaposing a detailed CGE model with a dynamic learning framework makes it possible to quantify the impact of uncertainty and learning within an empirically grounded general equilibrium setting. The approach could be useful in other policy contexts, including public infrastructure investment or public safety measures.
In addition to the policy-relevant observations above, several other policy implications can be drawn from the analysis. First, uncertainty may push local policymakers to temporarily ban fracking until better information about associated damages becomes available. Consider the 2005
Energy Policy Act, which amended the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act to exclude fracking injection fluids (other than diesel fuels) from the EPA's oversight, while exempting extraction companies from disclosing the chemicals involved in fracking operations. This served to increase public uncertainty about the dangers of fracking which makes adopting a ban more attractive ceteris paribus.
Next, the rate of learning influences local policy decisions in a context of uncertain fracking damages. A high rate of learning makes a first period ban more appealing but makes fracking, if beneficial, more likely in subsequent periods. The value function when the decision remains (Equation 3) is weakly increasing in the rate of learning, implying that faster learning cannot decrease welfare. Consequently, the public has an interest in reducing the noisiness around fracking information through, for example, research and improved industry transparency.
Although the potential for learning could push a community to implement a temporary ban, it also creates the incentive to remove the ban if this is in their interest. Many policy options exist to support the opportunity for learning. These include funding for scientific research on impacts, information provision that enables homeowners to better negotiate with oil and gas companies (see Timmins and Vissing 2014) , encouraging municipalities to fund their own studies 21 , and providing assistance with local impact studies.
Our quantification of the QOV highlights an intriguing dimension of local fracking policy. The information-revealing signal about fracking damages is a public good. The ability to ban fracking and learn from others' experiences in similar, perhaps nearby, regions implies a free-rider problem where local jurisdictions obtain the benefits of information without contributing to its production. The full value of sophistication represents the local jurisdiction's willingness to pay for the ability to ban fracking and learn but there are currently no institutions that allow for its capitalization.
While useful, the model presented here has some important limitations. First, we assume that fracking policy is a binary (yes/no) decision. Feasibly, policymakers could choose both when to frack and at what intensity. When decisions are adaptable over time, the ability to learn tends to increase the level of development in early periods (Karp and Zhang 2006) . Allowing a small amount of fracking in certain areas of a given jurisdiction could result in very precise information about the true value of damages. Then, policymakers could adjust the amount of fracking to ensure optimality. This is similar to the result in Karp and Zhang (2006) that the ability to learn about climate sensitivity can increase early emissions levels. Despite this, binary policies such as local bans are common in practice and likely reflect political or legal constraints that prevent policymakers from employing more delicate instruments. Indeed, many bans have arisen through the blunt instrument of local referenda.
Second, we ignore the stochastic nature of energy prices. In reality, policymakers also learn about the value of the reserves they control. If prices have an upward drift, for example, this would create a further incentive to wait before fracking is allowed and oil and gas reserves are exploited. Future work should consider the interaction between stochastic energy prices and uncertain environmental damages.
Another limitation is that consumption benefits do not capture distributional effects. It could be that the economic benefits accrue to a small fraction of the local population. Routine burdens, including noise and light pollution or increased traffic, tend to affect those most closely located to fracking operations (Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber 2014) , but as Hill (2013) points out these are often socio-economically disadvantaged groups that may not receive the benefits from fracking.
A mismatch between those that benefit and those that incur the costs from fracking is not considered here but future work should investigate how this could affect the local political economy of fracking policy decisions.
Despite the limitations of the model developed here, it provides a useful tool for evaluating the economy-wide net benefits of oil and gas development for a range of economies, from local to national scales. A numerical QOV model has the potential to explain existing decisions or to inform policy choices in the future. Our results suggest that when the net benefits of fracking, including consumption benefits and environmental damages, are not clear, the ability to learn about uncertain fracking damages over time can play a pivotal role in the decision-making process. This was revealed in our calibrated example but this lesson can be applied more generally to other economies considering a binary policy choice with irreversible consequences.
